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Abstract—Security and privacy in Vehicular Ad-hoc Networks
(VANETs) mandates use of short-lived credentials (pseudonyms)
and cryptographic key pairs. This implies significant computa-
tional overhead for vehicles, needing to validate often numerous
such pseudonyms within a short period. To alleviate such a
bottleneck that could even place vehicle safety at risk, we
propose a proactive pseudonym validation approach based on
Bloom Filters (BFs). We show that our scheme could liberate
computational resources for other (safety- and time-critical)
operations with reasonable communication overhead without
compromising security and privacy.
Index Terms—Bloom Filter, Pseudonym, Security and Privacy
I. INTRODUCTION
Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V) communication improves road
safety and traffic efficiency with safety beacons, broadcasted at
a high rate to provide cooperative awareness. Short-term cre-
dentials, i.e., pseudonyms obtained from the Vehicular Public-
Key Infrastructure (VPKI) through protocols as in, e.g., [3],
[11], [6], are used for message (beacon) authentication and
integrity while protecting user privacy. Pseudonyms with over-
lapping or non-overlapping lifetimes can be preloaded, for a
long period (e.g., 1 year) or be requested on-demand (e.g.,
on a daily basis). In a multi-domain Vehicular Communi-
cation (VC) system, pseudonyms in a domain are generally
issued by the Pseudonymous Certification Authority (PCA)
dedicated to that domain, and a vehicle that wishes to enter
another (foreign) domain should request pseudonyms from the
corresponding PCA. For ease of explanation, we assume the
domains are separated geographically in the rest of the paper.
Pseudonyms are changed over time for message unlink-
ablity. Due to mobility of vehicles, the neighborhood of a
vehicle can be volatile, thus, having new pseudonyms received
practically continuously. The challenge is that all such digitally
signed new pseudonyms must be validated in order to verify
messages. Certificate omission [2], and optimistic or proba-
bilistic message validations [5], [1], [7] have been proposed,
but they do not reduce pseudonym validation overhead. In
some situations, a vehicle could receive a very large number
of new pseudonyms within a short period (e.g., around a mix-
zone [4], where all vehicles would change their pseudonyms).
We propose a Bloom Filter (BF) based pseudonym vali-
dation scheme. Instead of verifying the PCA signature for
each and every pseudonym, the pseudonyms are validated
through a BF published by the PCA, which includes all
pseudonyms valid within a protocol selectable period. Once
the BF is verified and stored, a vehicle can efficiently validate
the pseudonyms based on cheap hash computations with
reasonably low false positive rate.
We require that all the pseudonyms are still signed by the
PCA and the messages be signed under the pseudonyms.
This ensures that a fallback approach (i.e., PCA signature
verification on each and every pseudonym) can be invoked
when suspicious behavior is detected. We show that our
scheme could reduce computational overhead. Although an
attacker could launch a brute false attack targeting the false
positive rate of the BF (attempting to inject messages signed
under fictitious pseudonyms), we show that such an attack is
expensive and could cause minimal harm to the system.
In the rest of the paper, we describe the adversary model
(Sec. II), present our pseudonym validation scheme inspired
by [10] (Sec. III), provide a security and privacy analysis
(Sec. IV), and a preliminary evaluation of our scheme (Sec. V)
before some concluding remarks (Sec. VI).
II. ADVERSARY MODEL
We consider (external or internal) adversaries that attempt to
insert false messages, without using a legitimate private/public
key pair and the corresponding pseudonym in order to affect
other vehicles. Such an attack could inject, for example, a
false event (e.g., a non-existing accident). In addition, we
consider adversaries interested in launching clogging Denial
of Service (DoS) attacks, i.e., sending out messages with fake
signatures at a high rate, in order to consume resources of
benign vehicles (and leave them with scarcer resources for
processing legitimate, and potentially critical, messages).
Internal adversaries could threaten the network by send-
ing out false information with valid signatures under valid
pseudonyms. Misbehavior detection would then lead to their
identification and eviction; this is orthogonal to this paper.
III. OUR SCHEME
A. Preliminaries
Counting Bloom Filter: BFs [8] are used for efficient
membership checking in Internet applications. A BF is built
based on elements of a dataset, and the published BF can
be used for membership checking for a given element. Each
element in the set is hashed with k hash functions, while the
output of each hash function is a position in an m-bit vector
and these k positions are set to 1. However, if any of them is
already set to 1 upon a previous insertion, these bits are simply
kept as 1 and ignored. For a membership checking, the element
is hashed with k hash functions, and the derived k positions
are compared with the BF. If all k positions are 1, then the
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element has passed the membership test. A BF reduces spatial
overhead at the expense of a false positive rate. An element
not included in the original dataset could pass the BF test if all
k positions for this element were set to 1 by other elements.
For a standard BF (the type we consider in our paper), m and
k are chosen based on the number of the dataset elements, n,
and the false positive rate to minimize spatial overhead, m [8].
A standard BF supports insertions of new elements but
no deletions: a bit in the BF might be needed by multiple
elements. A new BF has to be built from scratch if elements
are deleted. Counting BFs [8] maintain a counter for each bit,
indicating the times it was set to 1. Therefore, when an element
is deleted, for each of its k bits, the counter is decreased by
1. If a counter is decreased to 0, then the corresponding bit in
the BF is also set to 0. The size of a counter should be chosen
properly [8].
Compressed BF-Delta: Compressed BF-deltas [8] can be
used to publish updates when a few of the BF elements are
changed (e.g., inserted or deleted). This provides an efficient
way to publish differences (in terms of each bit value) between
old and new BFs with minimum overhead.
Note: An alternative to BFs could be a concatenation
of hash values for elements in the dataset, published as a
hash list. For membership checking, the hash value of the
element is computed and searched in the hash list. However,
for a large dataset, BFs are far superior in terms of spatial
overhead [9]. Moreover, searching in a hash list requires O(n)
time complexity, while a BF-based checks require O(k) time
complexity (with k  n, typically, for any sizeable dataset).
B. Scheme Overview
We propose an efficient pseudonym validation scheme based
on BFs. The PCA generates a counting BF based on all the
currently valid pseudonyms issued to vehicles. Compressed
BF-deltas are used to publish updates in case of insertions
(e.g., new pseudonyms provided in response to recent requests)
and deletions (e.g., revocation of pseudonyms). Vehicles can
download the BF (without the counters) from the PCA once it
is built, and download periodically newer versions (or deltas).
Once the BF is downloaded, vehicles could validate received
pseudonyms with the BF, at a processing cost that is a tiny
fraction of that to validate a digital signature by the PCA.
If a pseudonym does not pass the BF test, e.g., in the event
recently issued pseudonyms are not yet included in the BF,
a receiving/validating vehicle can always choose the fallback
approach (referred as the baseline scheme in the rest of this
paper): verify the PCA signature on the pseudonym.
C. Bloom Filter based Pseudonym Validation
Without loss of generality, we assume the majority of
vehicles (e.g., local vehicles) have been preloaded with
pseudonyms for a period, Γ (e.g., 24h), thus covering
[tstart, tstart+Γ]. We assume these pseudonyms are requested
well in advance before tstart. The PCA generates a BF that
includes the pseudonyms covering [tstart, tstart + Γ]. We do
not dwell on the selection of tstart; e.g., a point during the
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Fig. 1: BF Construction with k hash functions
night could be chosen, so that vehicles request pseudonyms
and download the new BF while parked.
Pseudonyms can either have overlapping (e.g., 100
pseudonyms for each vehicle, all valid for 24h) or non-
overlapping (e.g., 144 pseudonyms for each vehicle, each valid
for 10min) lifetimes. In the former case, an element in the
BF is the public key of a pseudonym; while for the latter
case, an element is the combination of a public key and its
corresponding lifetime. Fig. 1 shows the construction of the
BF based on the pseudonyms. Although the PCA maintains
a counting BF, only a standard BF is published, because the
counters are not necessary for pseudonym validation; counters
are used to support insertions and deletions to the BF. While a
larger counter size results in higher storage overhead (for the
PCA), this does not affect the size of downloaded BF (thus
the communication overhead for the vehicles).
Vehicles that did not request pseudonyms from the PCA
before tstart could request pseudonyms throughout the day.
This can be, e.g., due to non-predictable trips or new vehi-
cles joining from other domains. As these vehicles request
pseudonyms from the PCA, the BF has to be updated to cover
these new pseudonyms. A vehicle could update the BF either
proactively, when the vehicle is parked, or reactively, when
it starts receiving a considerable amount (above a protocol-
selectable threshold) of pseudonyms not included in the BF.
We use compressed BF-deltas to minimize the communication
overhead for updating the BF.
As BF exhibits a false positive rate, a fake pseudonym
discovered by a brute force search (with very low probability
if we choose m appropriately) could be accepted even if it
were not issued by the PCA (see Sec.IV for more details).
This can be mitigated by applying a probabilistic verification
even if a pseudonym passed the BF test. If such a double-
checked pseudonym is proven fake, it is reported to the VPKI
and published in a Fake Pseudonym List (FPL). An FPL is a
list of detected fake pseudonyms that could pass BF tests.
Validation process: In order to validate a pseudonym,
the receiver first tests the pseudonym against the currently
available local version of the BF. If the BF test is successful,
the pseudonym is checked against the FPL: the pseudonym is
validated if it is not included in the FPL. If the pseudonym did
not pass the BF test, the signature on the pseudonym has to
be verified (i.e., the baseline scheme). To ensure resilience to
clogging DoS, the fraction of such baseline validation should
be conservative and adaptive. In order to mitigate the effect
of fake pseudonyms, for each pseudonym that passed BF
m/n (bits/element)
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Fig. 2: False positive rate as a function of m/n
test and FPL check, the receiver could verify probabilistically
(with a low probability) the signature on the pseudonym. If
this pseudonym cross-verification fails, the fake pseudonym is
reported to the VPKI and added to the FPL.
IV. SECURITY & PRIVACY ANALYSIS
Non-repudiation, authentication and integrity: We re-
quire that all valid pseudonyms and messages be signed by
the PCA and their senders respectively. Thus, our scheme does
not affect the non-repudiation of the messages. The BF and
its deltas are authenticated and cannot be repudiated. If the
received pseudonyms are not included in the local BF or, in
case, any suspicious actions are detected, vehicles can always
validate pseudonyms using the baseline scheme.
Fake pseudonyms: An adversary could target the false
positive rate of a BF, shown in Fig. 2 as a function of m/n
(bits per element) [8]. For example, when m/n = 80 bits,
the false positive rate is around 2× 10−17. Consider the case
the pseudonyms have the same lifetime (e.g., valid for 24h).
On average, an attacker would have to generate around 1017
public/private key pairs to find a fake one passing the BF test,
each test needing k hash computations. If the pseudonyms
have non-overlapping lifetimes, a pair of public/private key
could be tested with different lifetimes, thus less key pairs
would be needed to find one passing the BF test. However,
such a fake pseudonym can only be used for a short period
(i.e., within its lifetime). Moreover, probabilistic verification
further shortens the period a fake pseudonym can be used
before being detected. Last but not least, a limited num-
ber (depending on the processing power of the attacker) of
fake pseudonyms would not significantly affect the system if
vehicles with valid pseudonyms are the majority within the
neighborhood. Overall, such a brute force attack is expensive,
and it may have a negligible effect.
Privacy of newly joining vehicles: A PCA would update its
BF as new vehicles join the domain (and request pseudonyms).
However, this raises a privacy concern that pseudonyms of
new vehicles could be easily linked. For example, if the BF is
updated for three new vehicles which appear in different parts
of the domain; a global passive attacker could easily link the
sets of pseudonyms that were not included in the old BF. This
can be mitigated by updating the BF only when a considerable
amount of new vehicles joins the domain, essentially, creating
a larger anonymity set for those new comers.
Thwarting clogging DoS: No invalid pseudonyms (or mes-
sages) would be accepted by the baseline scheme. However,
this makes clogging likely: an attacker could generate arbitrary
strings as public keys and attach arbitrary strings as signatures,
and broadcast at a high rate. This kind of attack is cheap, while
consuming resources of benign vehicles to verify the fake
signatures. Optimistic message verifications have been widely
studied while some of them rely on short-term linkability of
the messages signed under the same pseudonym. For example,
[7] proposes to use TESLA for the verification of following
messages after a signature verification on the first message.
However, it would be pointless to thwart this kind of attack
by sacrificing linkability among the pseudonyms. Our scheme
can efficiently thwart such an attack, while an attacker needs
significant effort to find false positive pseudonyms as we
discussed earlier. If increasing amount of pseudonyms with
fake signatures (that do not pass BF tests) are received; the
fraction of CPU time assigned for verifying signatures on
pseudonyms (including both new legitimate pseudonyms and
randomly generated pseudonyms) can be reduced and vehicles
should update their BFs in order to properly validate legitimate
pseudonyms.
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
A. Communication Overhead
Consider a BF with a false positive rate of 10−20. If n =
14 400 000 (100 000 vehicles equipped with 144 pseudonyms
valid for 24h each), m ≈ 164.5 Mbytes (m/n ≈ 96 bits,
see Fig. 2). The original BF can be downloaded before a trip
starts, which takes, e.g., around 1min with a bandwidth of
20 Mbps. The size of the BF is acceptable considering the
volumes that could be provided by off-the-shelf hard-drives
nowadays.
The use of compressed BF-delta [8] decreases the commu-
nication overhead to update the BF. The compression rate can
be computed, with q = p(1− pf ):
Compression Rate = −q log2 q − (1− q) log2(1− q), (1)
where p is the probability that a bit in the original BF is 1,
and q is the probability that a bit in the BF-delta is 1 after a
fraction, f , of pseudonyms are added to the original BF. For
a standard BF, which we use in our scheme, m/n and k are
chosen so that p ≈ 1/2 [8].
Fig. 3 shows the compression rate of a BF-delta as a
function of f . If 144 000 new pseudonyms (for 1 000 new
vehicles) were added, then the size of the compressed BF-delta
is around 6.2 Mbytes (with a compression rate of 0.0045). For
10 000 new vehicles, it is 34.8 Mbytes. We should note that
the false positive rate of the BF increases as pseudonyms are
added, because more bits are set to 1. The probability that a bit
in the updated BF is 1 can be computed as: p′ = p+(1−p)q.
For example, if 10 000 (i.e., f = 0.1) new vehicles would join
everyday, p′ = 0.6 after adding the pseudonyms. Then, the
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Fig. 3: Compression rate of BF-delta as a function of the
fraction of added elements.
false positive rate of the updated BF is around 3.29× 10−20:
a slight increase from 10−20. We refer the reader to [8] for
the false positive rate calculation.
B. Computation Overhead
In our scheme, validation of a pseudonym requires k
hash computations, which is much cheaper than a signature
verification. Consider the following case: N vehicles are
within a vehicle’s communication range and the neighborhood
refresh/change (in terms of new pseudonyms) ratio is c per
second. Each vehicle broadcasts γ beacons per second. We
assume ECDSA-256 for both the pseudonyms and the PCA
certificate, and signature verification delay τ = 4 ms (a typical
value from the literature [2]). For simplicity, we assume the
delay of a BF test is 0 ms (in reality, it introduces a tiny delay
for k hash computations, which can be in the order of µs) and
all the pseudonyms from N neighbors are included in the BF.
We consider a two-class M/D/1 queue for message veri-
fications, as in [2]. The first class includes messages signed
under new pseudonyms and the second class includes mes-
sages signed under stored pseudonyms. The average system
time, T¯ (total time in the queue until a message is verified),
can be represented as:
T¯ = S¯ +
λ1S
2
1 + λ2S
2
2
2(1− ρ) , (2)
where S¯ is the average service time, and λi and Si are the
arrival rate and the service time of ith class. We can derive
that λ1 = cN , λ2 = γN − λ1 and S2 = τ , while S1 for the
baseline and the BF-based schemes are 2τ and τ respectively.
From Little’s law, we know that ρ = ρ1 + ρ2, ρi = λiSi and
S¯ = ρλ1+λ2 .
Fig. 4 shows T¯ as a function of c when N = 50. As
expected, c does not affect T¯ for the BF-based scheme,
because BF tests introduce negligible delay. However, for the
baseline scheme, T¯ increases as c increases because more
signature verifications are needed for the new pseudonyms.
For example, when γ = 3 and c = 0.6, T¯ with the baseline
scheme is almost double of that with the BF-based scheme
(without proactive cross-verification).
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VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
We presented a BF-based pseudonym validation scheme.
We showed that the BF can be downloaded with acceptable
overhead and it can be used to validate pseudonyms efficiently
with a reasonably low false positive rate. Even though an
attacker could launch a brute force attack on the BF, this would
be expensive and likely to cause minimal harm to the system.
In this paper, we consider and analyzed the scheme with
one BF per domain. The immediate extension is to generalize,
e.g., with one BF per PCA (presuming multiple PCAs exist
in a domain), and download the BFs from all the PCAs in
the domain or even download BFs from PCAs in neighboring
foreign domains (to facilitate “roaming”).
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